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Forward unto the Digital Breach: Exploring the Legal
Status of Tomorrow's High-Tech Warriors
Adam Sherman*
In an air-conditioned compound far removed from the front line, a group
of people clothed comfortably in khakis and polo shirts sit intently in front of a
large array of computer screens. Half of them sit in consoles that resemble minicockpits, with real-time video feeds enabling them to navigate through the skies.
Hundreds of miles away, a formation of unmanned aircraft fly into position over
an enemy convoy, launching multiple air-to-stirface missiles and obliterating the
target. None of the people in the room are enlisted personnel for either
combatant. Rather, they work for the company that designed the system that
allows planes to operate under remote control with great precision. Shortly after
the successful attack, the enemy sends a commando unit to raid the compound.
The unarmed employees put up no resistance, and all are kidnapped and taken
behind enemy lines or to a location under the enemy's territorial control.
Pursuant to the Geneva Convention, the enemy state affords the employees the
full protection of the Convention.' The enemy state, however, notifies the

employees' government that it does not believe the employees are entitled to
POW status and orders a tribunal to resolve the issue.2
Such a scenario' highlights two seemingly irreversible trends in military
affairs, the increasing automation of warfare and greater reliance on civilian
contractors to perform essential military functions. The progress of these trends
threatens to expose a gray area in international law. Civilian contractors are
generally given the same protections as members of the armed forces of the
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Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), art 5, 6 UST 3316
(1956) (hereinafter GPW) (providing that "[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether persons ...
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal").
Id.
This scenario draws heavily on the use of unmanned Predator aircraft by the US military in
Afghanistan. See, for example, Craig Gordon, Report: Pilotless Aircraft Flawed; Militay Leaders
Disagree, CallIt the Next Generationin Surveillance, Newsday A27 (Nov 1, 2001).
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nation they serve.' In clarifying the protections offered to such persons,
however, the text of the Geneva Conventions suggests that its drafters
contemplated civilians operating only in a support capacity: construction,
transportation, and other back-area functions designed to facilitate the jobs of
soldiers in the field. 5 A 1977 Protocol to the Convention specifically denies
POW status to mercenaries-civilians who, among other things, engage in
combat for private gain.6
While the high-tech warriors of the future will probably not qualify as
mercenaries in a technical sense, they may operate outside the support role that
civilians integrated into armed forces have recently held and on which
international law has based their current legal rights. This Development seeks to
clarify the extent of current international law's uncertainty with respect to a
possible future of warfare with civilians engaging in "trigger-pulling" activities.
This Development proposes that, for international conflicts at the very least,
states should either confine "trigger-pulling" activities to enlisted personnel or
integrate such persons to the highest degree possible.
I. THE RUSH TO PRIVATIZE
"While the US army has shrunk by a third since the end of the Cold War,
the private military industry has grown rapidly."' During the Gulf War, the ratio
of private contractors to soldiers was one to fifty; in Iraq, the ratio is one to ten.8
The bulk of private contractor activity to this point has been logistical or
support tasks, but increasingly the US military has turned to civilians to perform
tasks that blur the line between contractor and soldier, such as operating drone
aircraft and maintaining tactical systems.9 After the laser-guided missile
entertainment show of the first Gulf War, the US took another technological
step forward with the use of unmanned Global Hawk surveillance aircraft in
Afghanistan. A companion model aircraft, the Predator, was also deployed,
equipped with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles. Despite some technical difficulties
with the Predator, military officials have expressed the view that such equipment
represents the future of warfare.1"
4

GPW art 4(A)(4) (cited in note 1).
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, art 47, 16 ILM
1391 (1977).
Ian Mather, WarInc on the March to Relieve US Troops,Scotland on Sunday 22 (uly 20, 2003).
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Technologically sophisticated warfare could potentially erode distinctions
between different types of private military firms. A common typology used to
differentiate these entities is "the Tip of the Spear."' 1 Firms implementing
military solutions (for example, engaging in combat) rest at the tip, "consulting"
firms offering strategy and training in the middle, and support firms offering
non-lethal aid and assistance at the base.' 2 The line between developing or
maintaining a remote weapons system, training enlisted personnel to operate
such a system, and having civilian technicians simply operate them for the
military is a fine one, which risks being muddled as armies increasingly adopt
"off-the-shelf technology" from private firms. 3
The willingness of the US to employ civilian firms in ways resembling
more traditional "mercenaries" also suggests that high-tech warriors might find
themselves on the virtual frontline sooner rather than later. In Colombia, the US
has employed civilian contractors to fight its war on drugs. It hired DynCorp, a
US firm, to operate drug eradication flights over territory controlled by the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (also known as FARC) guerrillas. It
also engaged in a search and rescue operation when a Colombian police
helicopter was shot down, for which it employed armed men.14 The US also
hired a private security firm to guard Afghan President Hamid Karzai after the
contingent of US Special Forces previously assigned to his bodyguard was
withdrawn. 5 Waging a remote-controlled war may be a particularly attractive
option when putting troops on the ground is politically unpopular or costly or
when overextension has made sending troops impractical.
II. CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS UNDER THE
GENEVA CONVENTION
The Geneva Convention offers explicit protection to "[p]ersons who
accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof.' 6 This
group includes "civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents,
supply contractors, [and] members of labour units or of services responsible for
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the welfare of the armed forces., 17 Although not an exhaustive list, as indicated
by the first quoted section, the text of the Convention emphasizes civilians
operating in a support capacity, fulfilling non-lethal functions. Indeed, at least
one author has suggested that civilian contractors who engage enemy forces may
lose their protected status upon capture.' 8 If such civilians are not entitled to
protected status, they may be subject to criminal prosecution by the capturing
state.19
For civilians engaging in trigger-pulling activities, the 1977 Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions sets out the criteria for who is a mercenary and specifically
20
denies such persons the right to prisoner-of-war status:
A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed
conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory
controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
21
official duty as a member of its armed forces.
The high-tech warriors of the future might not satisfy the technical
definition of mercenaries under the 1977 Protocol for a number of reasons. The
requirement that mercenaries not be members of a state that is a party to a
conflict would likely exclude civilians employed by the US army from being
classified as mercenaries (assuming that the US would shy away from using a
foreign firm). A number of private military firms, however, operate in countries
other than the US: Israel, South Africa, and the UK all boast highly capable
companies in the field. In the mid 1 9 9 0s, Croatia modernized its army with the
help of Military Professional Resources Incorporated, an Alexandria, Virginia-
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23
based firm that employs a number of former high-ranking military officials.
While such firms specialize more in military strategy, training, and
implementation, it is not unforeseeable that companies that specialize in hightech warfare may come to offer their services for hire.
A more important reason why high-tech warriors may not technically
qualify as mercenaries is the degree to which they are incorporated as members
of the armed forces of a combatant nation. Although at least one author has
asserted that all government contractor employees hold military status in the
field, the level of supervision and protection of contractors in the field suggests
that while this assertion may be correct at a superficial level, in practice
supervision has not been uniform. 4 Given that supervision becomes easier in a
virtual frontline, in contrast to the chaos prevalent in actual frontlines, the US
could require high-tech warriors to work in government facilities, or have them
operate their own facilities adjacent to or on military bases. In either case,
increasing the proximity of civilians to their military employers and facilitating
increased supervision by military authorities would create a high degree of
incorporation. Tightly integrating civilians who engage in virtual combat would
move them farther away from the 1977 Protocol's definition of "mercenary" and
perhaps reduce the likelihood that they would find themselves in legal limbo
upon capture.

III. FINDING A PLACE FOR THE NINTENDO WARRIORS
Under current law, it seems that so long as states integrate civilian
contractors into their armed forces, they should be entitled to Prisoner of War
status. The drafters of the 1977 Protocol apparently contemplated the issue of
civilians taking up arms,25 but blanket protection for civilians hired to engage in
trigger-pulling activity does not appear in the text of the Protocol itself. To
ensure the safety of such civilians, the degree of integration into the armed
forces should mirror the proximity to the "tip of the spear." To avoid any
confusion, civilians at all levels should be given proper identification and
protection. At least as far as the US military is concerned, provision of basic
identification and training to civilians being deployed in the field has been fairly

23

Id at 5.
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Compare Maj. Brian H. Brady, Notice Provisionsfor United States Citizen ContractorEmployees Sening

with the Armed Forces of the United States in the Field: Time to Reflect Their AssimilatedStatus in Government
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Contracts, 147 Milit L Rev 1 (1995), with Renae Merle, No Protection Polgfor Overseas Contractors;
Oversight 7nconsistent,' Report Says, Wash Post E3 (June 26, 2003).
International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentay on the AdditionalProtocolsof 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 at 515 (Martinus Nijhoff 1987) (Yves Sandoz, Christophe
Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmerman, eds) (suggesting that any civilian incorporated into an armed
organization is a combatant while hostilities are ongoing).
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satisfactory.2 6 If the wars of the future will be fought in significant part by hightech civilian warriors, and countries other than the US begin to employ such
persons, international compliance with certain minimum levels of protection and
identification will become an issue. Civilians require the highest level of
integration-perhaps via temporary conscription regulated by contract between
the company, its employees, and the state waging war.
History provides an example of full integration. During World War II, the
US Navy hired numerous civilian construction companies to complete military
projects throughout the Pacific. After the capture of many such persons, the US
Navy created the "Fighting Seabees"-Construction Battalions which were fully
integrated into the Navy. 27 Although the legal rationale behind such explicit
assimilation has been questioned, 28 a form of this solution may be desirable in
the event that high-tech warriors become notorious and are singled out as
targets by warring nations. Full assimilation, however, runs against the need for
flexibility evidenced by the trend toward privatization. Military forces may thus
be reluctant to integrate such civilians beyond a temporary basis, even if a
lengthy conflict, fought in large part by remote-control, might make such a
move practical.
US Army regulations already require use of uniforms by citizen employees
when the commanding general in the field determines that it is necessary for
their safety.2 9 For trigger-pulling civilians, commanders in the field should make
generous use of such provisions.
Addressing the current legal status of high-tech warriors will also serve to
clarify what a government's responsibilities to civilian contractors in the field are
from the standpoint of supervision and protection.3 ° Voluntary refusal to
employ high-tech mercenaries for trigger-pulling activities may be another easy
option for militaries concerned about the legal status or their ability to protect
civilians in zones of conflict. Given that private military firms already bear the
burden of training the military to use new technologies, such a solution would
actually represent a continuation of current practice and a small halt in the trend
toward privatization.
The likelihood that high-tech warriors will be employed in conflicts other
than state-against-state warfare makes some of the discussion about their status
moot. In an unequal fight, a non-state entity (such as the FARC or remnants of
26
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<http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/r670_10.pdf> (last visited Mar 29, 2004).
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the Taliban, to cite recent examples) may not have an incentive to treat enemy
soldiers, let alone civilian combatants, humanely. The failure of the US to accord
the full protections of the Geneva Conventions to persons captured in
Afghanistan and other terrorist suspects, under the view that such persons do
not meet the definition of soldiers, could make US-employed civilian triggerpullers equally susceptible to a re-crafting of their status to deny them adequate
treatment. More complete incorporation into the armed forces, then, may not
ensure adequate treatment for civilian combatants in the hands of non-state
entities. But given the inevitability of state-against-state warfare, the US and
other nations employing private contractors would do well to clarify the
protected status of private contractors in the near future.
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